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Summary. The goal of this investigation was to apply lightweight formal methods to the 
study of the security of the JavaScript language. Previous work [1] has shown that 
lightweight formal methods present a new approach to the study of security in the context 
of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Since there is a (somewhat) formal specification for 
the JVM, but there is nothing approaching a formal specification for JavaScript security, 
the current work has attempted to codify best current practices in the form of a security 
model for JavaScript. Such a model is a necessary component in analyzing browser 
actions for vulnerabilities, but it is not sufficient. It is also necessary to capture actual 
browser event traces and incorporate these into the model. The combination of the static 
model template representing the security rules, together with the state data derived from 
the browser actions, creates a complete model that can be analyzed. The work described 
herein has demonstrated that it is (a) possible to construct a model for JavaScript security 
that captures important properties of current best practices within browsers; and (b) that 
an event translator can be written that captures the dynamic properties of browser site 
traversal in such a way that model analysis is possible, and will yield important 
information about the satisfaction or refutation of the static rules. This paper will first 
describe the nature of the problem, namely the scope of security vulnerabilities when 
using JavaScript. It will then describe the security model and event translator, and present 
the results obtained for actual analysis of real-world websites. Finally, a description of 
future work will be given. 
 
Background. The JavaScript language is a website scripting language that has achieved 
extremely high penetration on the Internet. Unfortunately, this popularity, combined with 
some intrinsic aspects of JavaScript that will be discussed below, have made JavaScript a 
particularly enticing target for malware authors. According to some statistics [2], 
JavaScript-based web attacks, particularly Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross Site 
Request Forgery (CSRF), account for the majority of all web-based malware. Statistical 
data on malicious incidents in the past four years [3] indicate that XSS alone may account 
for as much as seventy percent of all malware. Malicious JavaScript can do damage in 
and of itself, or it can act as a delivery system for a malicious payload that is executed on 
the client’s (victim’s) machine. JavaScript is a purely interpreted language. Although it is 
named after Java, and bears some syntactic resemblance to Java, JavaScript is in fact 
quite distant from Java at the semantic level. The Java programming language has a 
published specification for the language [4] and also for the virtual machine on which 
Java class files actual run [5]. Thus, Java can be said to have a formal security model as 
expressed by the constraints that a conforming Java class file must satisfy to be 
executable. The same cannot be said for JavaScript. JavaScript has a loose collection of 
rules that conforming browsers should obey, but these rules are not standardized, and 
variations in the strictness of different implementations can be readily observed by 
viewing the same website in different browsers. Part of the work described in this report, 
therefore, has involved the creation of a formal (but currently partial) security model for 
JavaScript. The goal in creating this model has been to capture best current practices and 
create a model that is sufficiently restrictive that aberrant behavior associated with 
malware can be identified, while still permitting legitimate website traversals to be 
properly executed. As with the prior Java work, this JavaScript security model has been 
expressed in terms of constraints, which have then been encoded as an Alloy model 
template. When a properly instrumented browser visits a website, event data is collected, 
and a translator run over the event log. The output of the translator is a set of Alloy 
relation initializers. When these initializers are combined with the Alloy model template 
that expresses the security constraints, a complete Alloy model is obtained. The Alloy 
analyzer can then be run against the model to look for counterexamples. 
Counterexamples are constraint violations, and constraint violations are potential 
vulnerabilities. One goal in developing the constraint model is to reduce or eliminate 
false positives (a counterexample appearing when a non-malicious website is traversed) 
and also false negatives (a counterexample is not found in the presence of malicious 
behavior). To some extent, this has proven to be a heuristic and iterative process; the 
evolution of the constraints studied will be described below. Developing a complete 
security model for JavaScript is a large task, so the focus of the current work has been to 
demonstrate the conceptual soundness of the approach on a small but meaningful set of 
constraints. The goal of the current work has been to show that non-trivial XSS attacks 
associated with the violation of the “same origin policy” can be detected. It has also been 
a goal to provide an extensible model and translator framework, so that new constraints 
and new event types can be handled as the work matures. 
 
Prior work on JavaScript security (and web-facing application security in general) has 
primarily focused on classification-based approaches [6, 7]. Such approaches attempt to 
classify attack vectors, and then define policies which a “safe” script must obey, such as 
the same origin policy [8]. The same origin states, informally, that a safe script may only 
read properties and documents that have the same origin (host) as the originating 
document. (A more comprehensive definition of the same origin policy will be given 
below when the model template is described.) At the present time the number of such 
JavaScript policies is very small, and their development to date has been ad-hoc in nature. 
A formal specification for the document object model (DOM) of a webpage does exist 
[9], but this specification does not fully address the dynamics of client-server interaction, 
and is not a constraint-based security specification. There does not seem to be prior work 
on the application of formal methods to JavaScript security. 
 
Security Model.  In order to understand the proposed JavaScript security model, it is first 
necessary to briefly review the constraints being modeled, and also consider the ways in 
which malicious code can bypass those constraints. The primary JavaScript security 
policy is the “same origin policy”. When a web page is loaded into a browser it may 
contain embedded JavaScript, typically delimited by <SCRIPT></SCRIPT> blocks 
within the HTML. Any script that occurs in this HTML context is known as a top level 
script. All top level scripts will have been loaded from a particular web site, namely the 
one associated with the containing HTML. Thus, top level scripts are associated with a 
unique origin. Top level scripts can cause other, subsidiary objects, including other 
scripts, to be loaded. In fact, as will be described below, there are several different ways 
in which a top level script can instantiate a subordinate script. The same origin policy 
states that subordinate scripts (and other subordinate objects, such as graphics, Flash 
objects, etc) should only be loaded from the “same” origin as the origin of the top level 
scripts. A naïve interpretation of this policy would assert that all the origins for all scripts 
should match exactly when expressed as IP addresses. In fact, a simple examination of 
network traffic between a browser and almost any script-enabled website shows that this 
interpretation is much too narrow. In order to capture best current practices, it is 
necessary to extend this policy to allow not only a tree of IP addresses (such as all the 
hosts within a subnet), but to allow several such trees, that is, a forest of IP addresses. 
When actual model and the live data are presented, below, this will be made more 
explicit. 
 
What is the purpose of the same origin policy? Specifically, what is the risk to the user if 
the same origin policy is not properly enforced? The risk occurs due to the nature of 
HTML documents. HTML documents have a flat structure, in which control elements, 
formatting and content are intermixed. When data is provided by a web client, typically 
in an HTML form or query, that data can be used by server-side scripts to dynamically 
generated HTML containing the response. This type of “reflection” can create a 
vulnerability if the input is not properly sanitized, e.g. if HTML control characters are 
presented as part of the input. The malware author can make use of this failure to 
properly handle input to create seemingly innocuous links that actually point to unrelated 
websites. They can cause the user to navigate to one of these malicious links 
automatically, without any human intervention, because the attacker has placed code that 
executes within the security context of the browser, and so is trusted. If the same origin 
policy is properly enforced, however, such malicious redirection should be blocked, 
because active content (scripts, for example) that come from outside the origin of the top 
level script will not be loaded or executed. Thus, even if input sanitization is not handled 
properly, the attacker will not be able install code that autonomously redirects the user. 
For a more complete description of cross site scripting attacks and the ways that they can 
leverage weaknesses in the same origin policy, see [7]. 
 
A JavaScript script can arrange to load other scripts in several different ways. In 
particular, the host address part for the script can be specified by a fully qualified domain 
name (FQDN), by a relative path, by an explicit IP address, or even by an IP address 
specified as a 32-bit number. (For the purposes of the current work, only IPv4 addresses 
are considered.) At the implementation level name resolution must take place and 
ultimately remote content fetched from one or more particular IP addresses. One might 
therefore model the set of IP addresses as a tree, for example, in which the root node 
corresponds to the top level of the remote host hierarchy (e.g. cnn.com), and subordinate 
nodes correspond to children of the root (e.g. images.cnn.com). Because name resolution 
of a FQDN may produce several answers, however, a tree structure is not general enough 
to encompass many real world situations. For example, looking up “cnn.com” produces 
six DNS answers, all within the same /16 subnet but apparently forming three constituent 
/24 subnets. For these reasons it was decided to model an organizational unit representing 
a remote (possibly virtual) host as a forest. A forest is modeled as a set of trees. A tree, in 
turn, is modeled as a collection of nodes, of two disjoint types: an address node and a 
host node. An address node is a collection of subordinate address and host nodes, much 
like a directory. An address node is never a leaf in the tree. By contrast, a host node is 
always a leaf in the tree (like a file). The Alloy signatures for these model items are: 
 
// ipv4 address 
 
sig ipv4 { 
 octet1: Int, 
 octet2: Int, 
 octet3: Int, 





abstract sig Node { } 
 
// addr nodes and host nodes 
// addr hode is a non-leaf, host node is a leaf 
 
sig AddrNode extends Node { 
      masklen:   Int, 
      hostlen:   Int, 
 netmask:   ipv4 
} 
 
sig HostNode extends Node { 
      hostlen2:  Int, 




    Node = AddrNode + HostNode 
} 
 
The final fact expresses the assertion that address nodes (directories) are disjoint from 
host nodes (files), and that any node must be one of the two types. An address node 
contains the netmask for its (sub)domain, as well as information on the length of the 
network and host parts. Of course, the model view contains deliberate redundancies. A 
host node contains a prefix length (host part) and an actual IP address. The signature for a 
tree element (which is based on the Alloy filesystem model), and a forest element, are as 
follows: 
 
// tree of nodes 
 
sig Tree { 
    reachable: set Node, 
    root:      AddrNode & reachable, 
    parent:    (reachable - root) -> one (AddrNode & reachable), 
    contents:  AddrNode -> set Node 
}{ 
   reachable in root.*contents 
   parent = ~contents 
} 
 
// forest of trees 
 
sig Forest { 
    trees:     set Tree 
} 
 
The tree signature contains four relations, a reachability relation (which expresses the set 
of nodes that can be reached by some traversal starting from the root), a root node 
relation (which must always be a reachable address node, since it is always a collection 
object even if there is only a single host in the collection), a parent relation (which is a 
map from a reachable node other than the root to exactly one reachable address node), 
and a contents relation (which is a map from an address node (collection) to the set of 
nodes that it contains). The two subsequent facts assert that all reachable nodes are in the 
reflexive transitive closure of the contents relation applied to the root node [reachable 
in root.*contents], and also that the parent relation is the inverse of the contents 
relation [parent = ~contents]. 
 
Given this model, one can then make assertions that should be true and verifiable in a 
valid realization of this model. Many of these assertions are not security assertions, they 
are statements about the model as a whole. For example, the Alloy fact 
 
fact { 
  all a: AddrNode | a.masklen + a.hostlen = 32 
} 
 
says that for all collection nodes, the lengths of the network part and the host part must 
sum to 32 bits. A less trivial assertion is the more specific prefix fact, which asserts that 
subordinate nodes must have more specific prefixes than their parents: 
 
fact { 
  all h: Node, t: Tree | (h in t.reachable) => 
     gte[h.hostlen, ((t.parent).h).hostlen] 
} 
 
More assertions of this form must be added in order to complete the “organizational unit” 
part of the model (for example, facts stating that the network and host parts must be non-
negative). In order to add the security facts that can then be checked by the model one 
must express the statement that a host, given as an IP address, either exactly matches the 
IP address given in at least one host node, or is contained in at least one address node’s 
subnet. However, in order to state this type of inclusion predicate, there is a technical 
challenge that must be addressed. This challenge relates to the way that integers are 
treated in Alloy. In fact, integers are treated as sets, and thus the range of values that an 
integer may hold is related to the size of the search space. Thus, if one attempts to 
validate a model with a qualifier of the form “for 8 int” this implies that integers are 
limited to 8 bits. As a result, using 32 bit integers is not practical, since the search space 
become to large. This is one of motivations for expressing an IP address as a set of four 
octets, rather than as a single 32-bit integer. It is not merely a reflection of the fact that IP 
addresses are conventionally written in terms of four 8-bit integers; it is a reflection of a 
practical computations limits for the model. This representation as a set of four octets 
leads to additional complications, however. When performing prefix arithmetic it is not 
necessarily the case that a prefix will always be a multiple of 8. In fact, prefixes such as 
/12, /18 and /23 are common for subnets. This means that checking whether an IP address 
is contained within a forest of IP addresses representing the allowed set according to the 
same origin policy may involve the use of bitwise operators. The current version of Alloy 
(4.1.10) does support bit shift operators; however, it does not support bitwise AND, OR 
or NOT operators, which significantly complicates the construction of an inclusion 
predicate. This issue will be explored more fully in the section on Alloy extensions, 
below. 
 
When a JavaScript script is loaded as part of a web page, all the functions that are defined 
as part of that script become part of the namespace of JavaScript functions accessible 
from within that webpage. However, this is not the only means by which JavaScript 
functions can become part of the scope of a top level script. In fact, there are three 
additional methods by which a script can create or load new script functions. First, a 
script can pull in additional script content by explicitly naming an external script through 
a “src=” tag. From the standpoint of the model such a sourced script is considered as a 
child of the script that sources it. Second, a script can use elements of the Document 
Object Model (DOM) to dynamically write new HTML, which can include new script 
code. This is typically done using the document.write() function, although other DHTML 
techniques can also be used. Third, new JavaScript objects can be loaded through a text 
file that describes those objects in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation). Such objects can 
change method (function) behavior through redirection. From the standpoint of the Alloy 
model it is desirable to allow for the possibility of different behaviors for each of the four 
script sources. While this makes the model more complicated, it does conform to best 
current practices for web technologies such as AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and 
XML). AJAX applications deliberately attempt to weaken the single origin policy in 
order to improve data sharing between the data/script components of an AJAX 
dashboard. 
 
For this reason it was decided to model a JavaScript script object as a container which 
can contain up to four different types of child script: a pure script (which will necessarily 
be a top level script defined in the origin HTML), sourced (indirect) scripts, dynamic 
scripts, and JSON scripts. This still preserves some aspects of a tree structure, but now 
there is not a single “contents” relation, there are four such relations. We define a script 
node and its subnodes in Alloy as 
 
// script nodes 
 
abstract sig ScriptNode { references: Forest } 
 
sig PureScriptNode, IndirectScriptNode, DynamicScriptNode, 
  JSONScriptNode extends ScriptNode 
 
and we require that the four nodes types are disjoint: 
 
fact { 
    ScriptNode = PureScriptNode + IndirectScriptNode + 
          DynamicScriptNode + JSONScriptNode 
} 
 
The tree of script nodes still has a reachability relation, and it also has a root relation 
which represents the top level script. We require that the root node be pure, namely that it 
be present within the top level HTML code of a loaded page. Any one of the four 
subnodes will have a unique parent, but there will be four content relations based on the 
subtype. This leads to the following Alloy signature: 
 
// tree of script nodes 
 
sig ScriptTree { 
    reachable: set ScriptNode, 
    root:      PureScriptNode & reachable, 
    parent:    (reachable - root) -> one (ScriptNode & reachable), 
    purecontents:  ScriptNode -> set PureScriptNode 
    indircontents: ScriptNode -> set IndirectScriptNode 
    dyncontents:   ScriptNode -> set DynamicScriptNode 
    jsoncontents:  ScriptNode -> set JSONScriptNode 
 
}{ 
   reachable in root.*purecontents + root.*indircontents + 
           root.*dyncontents + jsoncontents 
} 
 
Note that we can no longer assert that the parent relation is the inverse of the content 
relation, as was the case with the network address part of the model. Note also that for 
full generality, we use a (network address) forest relation for each type of ScriptNode, 
rather than imposing some a priori structure in the signature definition. 
 
Based on this model we can now write security assertions that can be verified for top 
level scripts and their tree of children. To do so, however, requires that we have defined a 
new Alloy primitive that corresponds to the IP address subset relationship described 
earlier. Before we talk about how this might be implemented concretely, let us write an 
example of a checkable assertion, assuming that this new primitive is called “ipin”: 
 
pred sameorigin_strict { 
   all F: ScriptNode, A: F.root.references | F.reachable.*(…content).references ipin A 
} 
 
In this notation the ellipsis …content is used to denote the set union of all four content 
types. In words, this predicate asserts that for all nodes that are reachable from the root 
script node, by any of the four means, any IP address accessed by one or more of those 
nodes is contained in the forest of IP addresses that are accessed by the root node. This 
statement is a restrictive form of the same origin policy in that it does not permit variant 
behaviors by the four subtypes (and would thus prohibit a great deal of AJAX code). For 
the immediate purposes of verifying that the model actually captures this more restrictive 
behavior, we will start with this assertion and build translator code from JavaScript event 
logs that can verify or refute this assertion concretely. 
 
How can the “ipin” relation be implemented? In Alloy one can reference internal 
functions exported by Alloy’s Java API from Alloy code. Thus, two things will be 
required to implement this new relation: (1) Java primitives that perform the appropriate 
address calculations, and (2) an Alloy file that defines the binding between the Alloy-
visible namespace of relations and the Java primitives. For example, integer operations 
are defined in util/integer.als. These functions reference Java exported functions. The 
extensions needed by Alloy to support the creation of an “ipin” relation are the subject of 
the next section. 
 
Alloy Extensions.  In order to perform the necessary IP address calculations in Alloy, 
several modifications needed to be made to Alloy itself. The first goal was to implement 
bitwise AND (bitand) and bitwise OR (bitor) binary operators, and also a bitwise NOT 
(bitnot) unary operator. These operators were successfully implemented and tested, in a 
manner that will now be described. Existing integer operations in Alloy are implemented 
in the file models/util/integer.als. This file defines a set of functions that indirectly call 
functions exposed by Alloy’s Java API. For example, the definition of the rem function is 
as follows: 
 
fun rem [n1, n2 : Int] : Int { n1 fun/rem n2 } 
 
Alloy supports file inclusion in a standard manner, where directory names act like 
namespace qualifiers. The special name “fun”, however, is not an actual directory. Any 
function that is named within the “fun” namespace is actually an Alloy function 
implemented in Java. Thus it is straightforward to add the three indicated functions to this 
file as: 
 
fun bitand [n1, n2 : Int] : Int { n1 fun/bitand n2 } 
fun bitor [n1, n2 : Int] : Int { n1 fun/bitor n2 } 
fun bitnot [n1 : Int] : Int { fun/bitnot n1 } 
 
In order to provide support for these operations within Alloy, several steps were taken. 
The Alloy parser is not directly implemented in Java; instead it is implemented using the 
CUP compiler, which takes a CUP specification as input, and produces parser code (in 
Java) as output. Thus, the first step was to modify the parser/Alloy.cup file to provide 
tokens INTBITAND, INTBITOR and INTBITNOT, and then declare that they are 
exported via the “fun” namespace. The next step was to modify the abstract syntax tree 
handling code to recognize these tokens. This involved modifying the files ast/Expr.java, 
ast/ExprBinary.java and ast/ExprUnary.java. Nodes of type “Expr” were created. The 
final step was to actually implement the operations. Alloy ultimately converts all 
expressions into a Boolean satisfiability problem and then uses a SAT solver to derive a 
satisfying instance or counterexample. The conversion between the AST representation 
and the SAT representation is handled by the translator portion of Alloy. When a node of 
type ExprUnary or ExprBinary is encountered by the translator, the operator it represents 
is extracted and then applied to the operand(s). Thus for a REM node the code is: 
 
case REM: I = cint(a); return i.modulo(cint(b)); 
 where “I” is of type IntExpression, “a” is the left subnode of the node, and “b” is the right 
subnode of the node. Thus for the two new binary operators the following translations are 
added: 
 
case BITAND: I = cint(a); return i.bitand(cint(b)); 
case BITOR: I = cint(a); return i.bitor(cint(b)); 
 
while for the new unary operator the translation becomes: 
 
case BITNOT: return cset(x.sub).bitnot(), x); 
 
In this latter case “x” is the node, and “x.sub” is its sole subnode (the target of the 
operator). Once the simple methods bitand(), bitor() and bitnot() were added to the 
IntExpression and Func classes the work of exporting the corresponding operations was 
complete. In order to avoid conflicting with Alloy’s built-in handling of the tokens “&”, 
“|” and “~”, no attempt was made to provide overloaded operators. Thus to invoke any of 
these three new operations, they must be written as a function call, e.g. “bitand[a, b]” 
rather than “a bitand b” or “a & b”. 
 
Unfortunately, an additional difficulty arose when attempt to extend these operations to 
provide the required “ipin” predicate. The difficulty arises due to the way that Alloy 
represents integers, as has already been described. Given the existing presentation for IP 
addresses using the “ipv4” signature, shown in the previous section, three approaches 
presented themselves. First, one could perform all operations by bit-shifting address 
components that do not fall onto an 8-bit boundary onto an address component that does, 
performing the corresponding bit-wise AND, OR or NOT, and then shifting back. The 
second approach would have been to provide an alternate method for handling integers in 
Alloy that would workaround its limitations on treating them as sets. In this approach, a 
new internal (Java) data type would be created to represent 32-bit quantities. In this 
approach an address, address prefix or integer would be bound to an Alloy variable by 
means of a new unary operator called “intern”. This would eliminate the need to 
manipulate integers or addresses using the Alloy “Int” data type. With this new operator 
it would be possible to write Alloy code such as 
 
 A = intern[128.89.81.219] 
 B = intern[0xFF FF F8 00] 
 C = bitand[A, B] 
 
In addition to requiring Java code that would expose “intern” through the “fun” 
namespace, support would be required from the Alloy parser to suppress interpretation of 
literals within the scope of an intern[] evaluation. Although this second approach would 
require more changes to the Java implementation of Alloy, it would appear to address the 
performance issue associated with integer manipulations. 
 
The third approach would be to restrict address calculations to those that did fall on 8-bit 
boundaries. While this approach only supports a subset of possible real-world data, it had 
the advantage of being significantly easier to implement than either of the other two 
approaches. For the purposes of the current work, the third approach was chosen as a 
compromise of development time versus functionality. The results presented in the data 
analysis section, below, reflect this choice of implementation. In future extensions of this 
work, the limitations imposed by this choice will be removed. Using this reduced 
formulation the “ipin” predicate was defined as 
 
 pred ipin[F: Forest, H: HostNode]  { 
  some A in F.Tree | ipinaddr[H, A.reachable] 
} 
 
which expresses the idea that for some rooted tree A in the forest of allowable addresses 
F, the newly fetched address (as represented by H, which is of type HostNode) satisfies 
the address inclusion predicate “ipinaddr” with respect to at least one node reachable 
from A. In order to understand the function of the “ipinaddr” predicate, consider an 
example (again, assuming only octet-based address and prefix alignment). The host 
address 128.33.0.20 is contained within itself; it is also contained within 128.33.0.0/24, 
128.33.0.0/16 and 128.0.0.0/8. Therefore we can express this “contained within relation” 
as the concatenation of four clauses. For the direct equality case the clause is: 
 
 H.hostip.octet1 == Ax.netmask.octet1 && 
H.hostip.octet2 == Ax.netmask.octet2 && 
H.hostip.octet3 == Ax.netmask.octet3 && 
H.hostip.octet4 == Ax.netmask.octet4 && 
Ax.masklen == 32 
 
(where Ax represents a member of the set A.reachable). For the /24 case the clause is 
 
 H.hostip.octet1 == Ax.netmask.octet1 && 
H.hostip.octet2 == Ax.netmask.octet2 && 
H.hostip.octet3 == Ax.netmask.octet3 && 
Ax.masklen == 24 
 
with similar formulations for the /16 and /8 cases. The “ipinaddr” predicate then can be 
written as 
 
 pred ipinaddr[H: HostNode, A: set Node] { 
  some Ax in A | (clause1 || clause2 || clause3 || clause4 ) 
} 
 
Browser Event Translator.  The Alloy security model described above is only a model 
template. It contains signatures and relations, but no initializers for those relations. As in 
the case of the earlier work on Java, live data (JVM bytecodes or website traversals) must 
be parsed and converted into relation initializers in order to create a complete model that 
can be submitted to the Alloy analyzer. Collecting the data needed by this translator 
required an instrumented browser, which is a web browser that had been specially 
modified to collect script execution data with sufficient fidelity that it could be used to 
initialize the two forests: the forest of trees of acceptable IPs, and the forest of trees of 
traversed IPs. The Firefox browser was chosen because it is open source, supports 
JavaScript debugging, and is widely used. It is necessary to capture both synchronous 
function execution and also asynchronous execution of event handlers (such as the 
onMouseOver() handler and other built-in JavaScript handlers). Fortunately, it is 
straightforward to do this in Firefox.  The default internal call hook, the function 
_callHook(), was modified to collect function and event trace information. This function 
is called with the execution context of the browser (a C++ object of type JSContext), and 
the current stack frame (a C++ object of type JSStackFrame, which contains sufficient 
information that stack traversal through higher level frames is possible). It was 
demonstrated that function and event information could be collected (two examples are 
shown below) that provided sufficient information so that relation initializers could be 
written to check the stated security constraints. 
 
Consider the JavaScript function: 
 
 alert(“This is an alert”); 
 
Execution of this function displays a dialog box with the indicated text and an “OK” 
button. The OK button is automatically bound to an internal callback function which 
dismisses the dialog box and takes no further action. Thus, in calling this function within 
the context of another JavaScript function, say “x()”, it should be possible to catch both 
the synchronous execution of “alert”, the asynchronous execution of the callback handler, 
and also to determine that alert() was called from within x(). These goals have been 
realized by appropriate manipulation of the calling context and call stack objects. The 
resulting trace (edited for readability) is shown below: 
 
_callHook(): 
 function:  alert 
 nargs:  1 
 arg0type: JSString 
 arg0:  “This is an alert” 
 
 event:  onClick 
 eventType: Button <class> 
 eventText: OK 
 coords: 235,644 
 
 function:  <anonymous> 
 nargs:  1 
 arg0type: integer 
 arg0:  0 
 
Once a website has been displayed by the browser, the event log is given as input to the 
translator. The event logs have been found to contain five types of data: (a) DNS names 
for IP addresses; (b) URLs containing DNS names; (c) raw IP addresses; (d) URLs 
containing raw IP addresses; and (e) numerically encoded IPs. The last category was 
unexpected, but presents no additional translation problems. For example, a numerically 
encoded version of 128.33.0.20 would be 2149646356, which is 128*224 + 33*216 + 0*28 
+ 20. When the translator encounters a URL, it separates it out the host part from the 
remaining parts of the URL. No attempt is made to translate embedded URLs that occur 
in the URL “command line” at this time. Thus, for example, given a complex URL of 
form http://www.msn.com/?ocid=hmlogout?ref=http://abcnews.com, the host part would 
be taken to be www.msn.com and the embedded URL “abcnews.com” would (currently) 
be ignored. 
 
If a DNS lookup is required, the translator performs it locally, and captures all the 
answers. Thus, if the lookup returns multiple values in the “answer” part of the returned 
DNS reply, all such values are used in populating the forest of IP addresses. One 
difficulty in the translation process is that none of the address generated by capturing 
script information contains IP address prefix information. Only IP addresses are present. 
Therefore a unification rule must be provided by the translator to infer prefix length from 
the data gathered. This can subsequently be verified using Autonomous System 
information for prefixes as published by the various Regional Internet Registries, e.g. 
published by RIPE at http://www.ripe.net/projects/ris/rawdata.html. (Currently this step is 
done manually.) The unification rule, as it is currently formulated, takes the most specific 
prefix from all DNS answers for a given URL. It does not attempt to unify across DNS 
answers from multiple URLs. Actually data is presented below. 
 
The output of the translator is a set of Alloy initializers (HostNodes and AddrNodes) for 
the model. Note that at the present time the event log contains a far larger set of 
information than is actually needed to create the IP address initializers. This will allow 
future versions of the translator to capture more information for a more extensive set of 
initializers and constraints. 
 
Website Testing and Data Analysis.  The goal of website testing is to verify that the 
same origin hypothesis is properly checked by the Alloy model and the initializers 
created by the translator. This has both positive and negative aspects. A conforming 
website should yield at least one instance (and no counterexamples); a nonconforming 
website should yield at least one counterexample (and no instances). For the purposes of 
conformance testing a fairly complex website is desirable, in particular one that loads a 
number of scripts and has a fairly dense forest of IP addresses, both within its own 
domain, and also from external domains. For the purposes of nonconformance testing, it 
is desirable that, at a minimum, it can be demonstrated that the “ipin” constraint is 
violated for site traversals that violate the same origin policy. To date model conformance 
has been verified for several conforming sites. Detection of malicious activity is not 
complete at this time. 
 
As an example, when http://abcnews.com is loaded, a large number of internal and 
external URLs are generated by the top level HTML code. The top level JavaScript file 
(based on network packet captures) is en_US/all.js. This script loads more than twenty 
subsidiary scripts from a large number of URLs. Captured URLs within the abcnews.com 
domain include: 
 
 abcnews.com  199.181.132.250 
 abcnews.go.com 198.105.195.49 
 a.abcnews.com 96.6.46.50; 96.6.46.35 
  unified to 96.6.46.0/24 
 ll.static.abc.go.com 208.111.128.6; 208.111.128.7 
  unified to 208.111.128.0/24 
 
Outside the abcnews.com domain the following URLs (among others) were seen: 
 
 edge.quantserve.com  64.94.107.0/24 
 www.google-analytics.com 74.125.113.0/24 
 
Several JavaScript script files are loaded from hosts outside any of the abcnews.com IP 
address blocks. This serves to confirm several of the speculated properties described in 
previous sections. First, if the same origin policy had been modeled as a rooted tree, 
rather than a forest of rooted trees, verification would have failed. Second, if only direct 
loading (via a “src=” script tag) had been modeled, verification also would have failed. In 
a number of cases the actual JavaScript that was executed was dynamically generated by 
combining components from a number of different sites (usually as a result of combining 
static content with advertising content). Thus direct loading, indirect loading and 
dynamic content creation were observed. However, it should also be noted that for the 
sites investigated, dynamic creation of content through the instantiation of JSON files 
was not observed. Most importantly, Alloy found several model instances and no 
counterexamples for the indicated benign sites. 
 
In conclusion, this work is the first step in the development of a complete formal security 
model for JavaScript, which will be expressed as a series of lightweight constraints. To 
date, the same origin policy has been encoded, and has been shown to yield model 
instances for valid websites. In addition, an instrumentation framework for the Firefox 
browser has been developed, and a translator created that converts the logged event 
output from the browser into Alloy initializers in order to create a complete model. 
 
Future Work. Several things need to be done in order to bring the JavaScript system to 
the same level of completion as the corresponding Java system. All the steps that are 
manually done during the translation process need to be incorporated into the translator 
so that they can be done in a fully automated manner. The Alloy constraints need to be 
generalized so that they can handle arbitrary prefixes, not just those that are multiples of 
8. This step may involve more work on Alloy internals, or it may be realized in terms of 
bitshift arithmetic. Additional work on detecting violations of the same origin policy 
needs to be performed so that actual detection of malicious activity is possible directly 
from the model. Finally, once it is possible to detect XSS, the set of constraints must be 
enriched with additional rules that will allow other types of malicious activity, such as 
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